>
>
> [0] I don't know for sure, but it is my suspicion that bayesian statistics
> explains this more clearly.  If there is anyone in the house that actually
> knows it, please speak...
>
>
https://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/group/731-s09/readings/Axelsson.pdf provides a
fantastic overview of the problem with false warnings and its impacts on
security warning design.
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/Grossklags-NSPW11.pdf
,
imo. provides a good model and argues why warning designers should reduce
the number of false warnings. I used this model to make some arguments
about how SSL logic should be a bit more forgiving in
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~devdatta/papers/trustmemaybe.pdf


> Sure, but warnings are useless.  Some people -- us -- might follow them.
>  Most have been trained for so long to click through


Recent data for Firefox and Chrome indicates that it is not true:
clickthrough rates are not like 90% or some crazy rate like that.
Clickthroughs are under 30% mostly.
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~devdatta/papers/alice-in-warningland.pdf


> them that they no longer read them.  Click-thru syndrome is a sad result
> of unreliable systems:  if the False Negatives (wrong warnings) are too
> frequent, and True Negatives (correct warnings) are too infrequent, then it
> simply doesn't work [0] as people learn to click-thru without further
> examination.


that said, I agree with you that the browser should actively try to reduce
the number of such false warnings. I argued for it in
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=776278 and I also think the
impact and the number of false warnings should play a big role in deciding
whether or not to block iframes.

I am not sure if the number of false-positives of blocking iframes was
considered. As far as I know, there isn't much telemetry on how many times
just mixed content iframes (everything else is secure) cause a warning.
Those numbers can help us out, but doing this measurement is tricky.
------

A couple more thoughts on this thread:

Making iframes "mixed active content" means that a user saying "yes, show
me the iframe" is also saying "and run any script over http in this secure
page".

I also think the comparison to IE is not apt---in the absence of
auto-upgrade, the compat hit IE takes is much lower. A more apt comparison
is Chrome, which didn't block mixed content iframes.

cheers
Dev
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