http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/205 is the most recent I can find. They factored a number of greater than 1024 bits, published on May 31 2007.
-Kyle H On Fri, May 30, 2008 at 1:31 PM, Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > At 9:49 PM +0300 5/30/08, Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: >>Paul Hoffman: >> >>> >>> >>>Again, I strongly strongly doubt that Mallory will try to break a >>>1024-bit key for this attack, at least for 20 years or more. >>> >>> >> >>I'm not sure from where you got this information > > RFC 3766, which is considered the "best current practice" for the > IETF. I am the co-author of the document, and before being published, > it was widely reviewed by cryptographers whose names you would > recognize. > >>, because apparently a group of people succeeded in cracking the key >>with 650 and something bytes already about two years ago with about >>40 64bit AMD dual machines in four month time. > > Googling that is failing me. > >>I write this all from memory because I can't find that article again. > > OK, but an actual reference would be helpful. > >>I'm sure a big cluster of always getting stronger CPUs (dual, quad, >>oct cores) will able to to get on 1024 bit keys in an ever shorter >>time until the point to make it economically interesting. > > Please say why you are sure. Yes, the existence of someone who is > richer that Bill Gates and who wanted to spend all of his money to > break a single key in about a decade would be "economically > interesting", but not in the way I think you meant. > > RFC 3766 is still used for making many important security decisions. > The numbers and math in it are essentially the same as those used by > NIST in the guidance that Nelson posted yesterday. To date, no one > has asked us to update it, or even to make any significant > corrections. If you know something we don't, it would be really > useful to the whole Internet community to hear more. > _______________________________________________ > dev-tech-crypto mailing list > dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto > _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
