We can't use the role feature of GitHub, thus committers have to be added manually by an admin.
Lausen, Leonard <lau...@amazon.de.invalid> schrieb am Do., 24. Okt. 2019, 00:55: > Hi Marco, > > do you mean retriggering PRs should be possible for all members of > https://github.com/orgs/apache/teams/mxnet-committers/members team? It > doesn't > work for me unfortunately (even though I login to the CI via my Github > account). > The retrigger button simply doesn't show up. > > Are any further steps required? > > Best regards > Leonard > > On Tue, 2019-09-17 at 14:47 +0200, Marco de Abreu wrote: > > Hi Sheng, > > > > will I'm in general all in favour of widening the access to distribute > the > > tasks, the situation around the CI system in particular is a bit more > > difficult. > > > > As far as I know, the creation of the CI system is neither automated, > > versioned nor backed up or safeguarded. This means that if somebody > makes a > > change that breaks something, we're left with a broken system we can't > > recover from. Thus, I preferred it in the past to restrict the access as > > much as possible (at least to Prod) to avoid these situations from > > happening. While #1 and #2 are already possible today (we have two roles > > for committers and regular users that allow this already), #3 and #4 come > > with a significant risk for the stability of the system. > > > > As soon as a job is added or changed, a lot of things happen in Jenkins - > > one of these tasks is the SCM scan which tries to determine the branches > > the job should run on. For somebody who is inexperienced, the first > pitfall > > is that suddenly hundreds of jobs are being spawned which will certainly > > overload Jenkins and render it unusable. There are a lot of tricks and I > > could elaborate them, but basically the bottom line is that the > > configuration interface of Jenkins is far from fail-proof and exposes a > > significant risk if accessed by somebody who doesn't exactly know what > > they're doing - speak, we would need to design some kind of training and > > even that would not safeguard us from these fatal events. > > > > There's the whole security aspect around user-facing artifact generation > of > > CI/CD and the possibility of them being tampered, but I don't think I > have > > to elaborate that. > > > > With regards to #4 especially, I'd say that the risk of somebody just > > upgrading the system or changing plugins inherits an even bigger risk. > > Plugins are notoriously unsafe and system updates have also shown to not > > really go like a breeze. I'd argue that changes to the system should only > > be done by the administrators of it since they have a bigger overview > over > > all the things that are currently going on while also having the full > > access (backups before making changes, SSH access, log access, metric > > access, etc) to debug errors. In the end we shouldn't forget that this > is a > > productive system - usually, you'd have nobody being able to touch it at > > all, but we're not in a perfect world, so I'd say we should restrict it > to > > a bare minimum in the form of admins. > > > > So while I certainly understand and encourage to distribute the access, I > > don't feel comfortable widening the access to such a critical productive > > system. It being down means that the GitHub development is fully halted, > > which is really problematic since we don't have rollback mechanisms. > > > > Best regards, > > marco > > > > On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 6:40 AM Sheng Zha <zhash...@apache.org> wrote: > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > I'd like to initiate discussion on how access control should be managed > > > for the CI system. The hope is that we can present the conclusion of > this > > > discussion as the recommendation and request to the donors of the CI > system > > > from Amazon. > > > > > > The specific aspects I'd like to discuss are the abilities to: > > > 1. trigger PR validation and nightly jobs. > > > 2. trigger continuous delivery jobs, such as for binary releases in > pip, > > > maven, and dockerhub. > > > 3. add jobs to the CI system. > > > 4. maintain and manage the CI system, such as system upgrades and > jenkins > > > plugin installation. > > > > > > Given that we already have GitHub SSO enabled on the Jenkins CI, I > suggest > > > the following authentication levels for these items: > > > 1. all authenticated GitHub users. > > > 2-4. all MXNet committers > > > > > > What do you think? If you have more aspects that you wish to discuss, > feel > > > free to propose. > > > > > > -sz > > > >
