On Thursday, December 12, 2019 6:04:55 AM MST Marius Schwarz wrote:
> because I already tried it ;) it's a tty problem with high secure ttys,
> hvcsomething. Thats the only one, the system accepts input from at
> start, but with QEMU that tty isn't present. Adding the normal ttys to
> the trusted list of ttys did not fix the issue. I had a br running years
> ago, but it got never solved afaik.
> 
> Maybe i should try again, as the last test was approx. 5 years ago.

I'd have to take a look at a test system, I'm running a Xen setup with CentOS 
7 DOM0, have no issues with Plymouth on other domains.

> If you have an offhost storage, as mass storage at a cloudhoster would
> be, the transport from the storage to the host needs to be secured too,
> which i don't think it is. So i don't think we need to even consider VMs
> to be encryptable, as securing the entire path is very tough and out of
> our league.

Well, luckily, that's not necessary. VMs have a lot of issues when it comes to 
security, but using LUKS is sufficient on a drive or partition, as no 
unecrypted data would go across the SAN. It's just what would be written to 
disk. Well, if you're using a block device from SAN, that is. I'm not 
accounting for NFS here, which can be secured using NFSv4.

> > Are you suggesting "translating", for lack of a better term, the
> > passphrase  between all available keyboard layouts? That would decrease
> > the effective security of your system considerably..
> 
> No, i mean, there can be two different passcodes for the same key. Luks
> offers 10 slots for them.
> On can be plain ascii as it's now, the other one can be the one the
> system had been installed with.
> 
> See it as a "Reserve- or Backuppassword", but in no way it should be a
> none-interactive password aka controlled by the installer. We don't need
> backdoors.

Ah, gotcha! That's a neat idea. I like it. That'd be a very nice way to handle 
it, potentially with an option in the installer to export that to a removable 
device for safe-keeping.

-- 
John M. Harris, Jr.
Splentity

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