"Scott G. Miller" wrote: > > If Alice doesn't know Bob's IP address she queries some other node and > > verifies that the response (which would include Bob's complete public > > key and current IP address) has been signed by Bob. > For this reason right here. The only way for that to reliably work is to > perform a request on freenet, which is just horrendously slow compared to > fetching a public key.
Fair point. This only needs to be done occasionally though, when a previously known IP address breaks or a reference to an unknown node is found. Weigh this against the alternative: those with a dynamic IP address must run a transient node, which does not offer plausible deniability for the operator. Fingerprint addressing would not be incompatible with the existing addressing scheme. The paranoid could use fingerprint addresses at the expense of performance; others could stick with the current addressing scheme. > Besides, you have to have an IP<->fingerprint link > to prevent man in the middle. Address or public key alone won't do it. Seems to me that a fingerprint should suffice. Can you elaborate? What am I missing? -- zem at zip.com.au F289 2BDB 1DA0 F4C4 DC87 EC36 B2E3 4E75 C853 FD93 zem.squidly.org "..I'm invisible, I'm invisible, I'm invisible.." _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
