> > Weigh this against the alternative: those with a dynamic IP address > must run a transient node, which does not offer plausible deniability > for the operator. How so? Running a transient node is just as secure as running a real node, if not more so since you dont store any data.
> Fingerprint addressing would not be incompatible with the existing > addressing scheme. The paranoid could use fingerprint addresses at the > expense of performance; others could stick with the current addressing > scheme. No. The current scheme wouldn't know how to handle the new addresses. Having the option to strip the fingerprints would allow a 'creeping' security hole in that parts of the network would become lax. Fingerprint addressing would probably not be a performance problem either. > > Seems to me that a fingerprint should suffice. Can you elaborate? What > am I missing? Every node in Freenet is untrusted. The only trust issues come in when you have been speaking to a node for a long time and suddenly it appears that its a different person (doesnt authenticate). To do that, you have to have some concept as to what you expect the fingerprint to be, otherwise you just have a whole shitload of meaningless public keys. You must have an Address->Key link so that you can say "I expect Address to have this key", at which point you can verify something. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 232 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20000816/2ddffd46/attachment.pgp>
