> I share that concern. We must acknowledge that even as it stands it > is unlikely that there would be a sustained attack against Freenet, if > we get *too* paranoid about security we could risk creating a white > elephant that is perfectly secure, but so slow that everyone goes for > a less secure, but faster, alternative. If this happens then we will > have failed. > > We must remain pragmatic in terms of balancing security with > efficiency.
Very true, although both can be accomodated by allowing a node to be configured to be more on the secure or efficient side. That's my I'm in favor of session key caching. The paranoid can always generate a new key, the speed junkies can cache a key for 24 hours (or some other reasonable maximum). _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
