On Sat, Jul 29, 2000 at 09:35:01PM -0500, Signal 11 wrote: > That's their job; It's no rumor. You can also invalidate traffic > analysis by sending in blocks of the same size at regular intervals, > Say, 100 * 1500 length packets per hour. If you put the cipher in > feedback mode (tcp/ip so you don't lose packets, obviously) the > contents will be scrambled beyond the ability of the NSA to monitor > more than a few nodes at a time. Invalidate your keys at regular > intervals (like kerberos) so you cannot issue a replay-attack on > the remote host. Anyway, blah blah blah.. let a real crypto > expert take the podium on this. :) > > The point is if you rearchitecture things to move in batch jobs > at regular intervals and queue requests it's impossible to see > where the data is going. After 1 or 2 hops, it's purely guess-work > to determine where the data is coming from and going to. I'm assuming > other nodes would aggregate traffic. I'm assuming one of the > goals of Freenet is plausible deniability - nobody can ever prove > a particular piece of data ever passed your node. If that is a > design goal, this will need to be implimented at some point if > you care about traffic analysis. You also need to take care to > pick a sufficiently large key size and cipher mode so as to make > cryptanalysis more difficult.
Of course, this would slow things down to nearly UUCP (or at best mailer daemon) speeds. Yeah, that is nice if you are extra paranoid, but if you really want to use Freenet, UUCP type speeds would discourage a lot of people. Of course, we could speed this up if there was constant traffic, which would make things about a bit faster than a mail daemon. Another thing that could be done that would allow single item batches is adding random nothingness onto the end of small batches. That would allow for fast batch oriented communication and would defeat traffic analysis to a good extent. > > 5) We glimpsed at the conference that often a couple of compromised > > nodes are sufficient to trace source/destination of remailer mail. > > Which is why you use multiple remailers... > > > 6) Carnivore precisely link-level compromises mix nodes. It does nothing > > more, nothing less. > > If you want to get creative.. create an abstraction layer in a freenet > server away from the network. You'll need to run it as root to do this, > but under linux you can bind the server to practically every port from > 1024:65535, and then tell the kernel to release each port as needed. > I know a program called Abacus PortSentry does this. You could arrange > several types of handshakes so Freenet could, in effect, function on > any port and on any protocol - TCP, UDP, ICMP.. it wouldn't matter. Of > course, it's a simple matter of programming to do this.. *cough* :) An abstraction layer would be quite nice. It would make Freenet versatile enough to work well over things like *phone lines/VoIP* (geez, would tunnelling Freenet through VoIP by simulating modem tones be really necessary?) or packet radio. By the way, is this the Signal 11 from Slashdot? ;) -- Travis Bemann Sendmail is still screwed up on my box. My email address is really bemann at execpc.com. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 2751 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20000729/45051da5/attachment.pgp>
