> > That would throw monitoring things at the link-level off. > > It would make it more difficult, but certainly not through it off.
Security isn't about making things impossible - it's about raising the bar to the point where it costs more to compromise the trust of the machine/network than the data is worth. By increasing the number of network fingerprints which freenet could use, you're increasing the number of rules and/or computations a sniffer or trace program would need to do. Assuming, of course, anyone really cares whether a 3rd party knows who went where and when. I don't know whether plausible deniability is a design consideration for freenet. > We want 100 000+ Freenet nodes running. This is not a mode of > attack (against Freenet - it is by far the best way to attack > many things) that has me up at night. Actually, the best way to crash freenet, IMO, would be to pollute the keyspace - create lots of replication conflicts/collisions and issue lots of bogus requests. I'd follow it up by loading BO2K with a custom java applet that requests bogus information to drown out legitimate information. 60,000 requests of natalie_portman.jpeg would make that file a priority for the server.. and it would clear its cache to accomodate. Freenet's biggest strength - dynamically mirroring high- demand content, could also be it's biggest weakness. > I don't know about your defenition of Slouch, but of like 30 > developers with cvs access we have only 4-5 doing any work. I'll see what I can do to raise that number. :) ~ Signal 11 _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
