Oskar Sandberg wrote: > A better DoS attack is: find a key that is closer to the targeted data's key > then any other on Freenet (even for cryptographically derived keys like all > will be from 0.3 onwards, this only takes about double as many tries the > number > of documents on Freenet, which is doable), and do a distributed attack with > thousands of clients sending thousands of requests for that key. Because the > data can't be found all/most of the requests will find there way to nodes that > the targeted data also clusters to, shutting them down. >
If I split a file using IDA, so that there are 100 parts, and any 50 are needed to reconstruct the file, this attack becomes 50 times as hard, doesn't it? The more parts you make, the more difficult it is to target one specific file. I could split the same file into 1000 parts, so that any 500 are needed to reconstruct the file, and suddenly the attack is another 10 times more difficult. However, If the split parts are being referenced from an SVK, then that SVK has to be duplicated as well to different keys, otherwise it can become the focus of attack. One way would be to cyclically rotate the string key that represents the SVK, and store under every combination, with the number of shifts stored along with key to allow reconstruction of the original SVK key and hence verification. _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
