On November 14, 2016 2:42:42 PM EST, Terry Zink via dmarc-discuss <dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org> wrote: >> Well, DMARC addresses one particular vector - we still need to find >more effective ways >> to address cousin domains, display name abuse, etc. > >I didn't mean cousin domains, I mean domains that are not the same but >have a relationship (e.g., one is a vendor of the other). They both >have weak authentication records (no DMARC, or DMARC + p=none), and >then one of them gets spoofed. > >So yes, the fix is to publish a stronger DMARC policy, but lots of >domains who publish DMARC have a weak policy. It's hard to get to >p=reject/quarantine if you are not a big company and are doing it >yourself.
It's also essentially impossible if you make non-trivial use of mailing lists. Even though I've has SPF -all records for over a decade and encourage people to reject mail purporting to be from my domains that fail SPF, I am no where near being able to do so for DMARC because of mailing lists. p= none is not just because people don't care. Scott K _______________________________________________ dmarc-discuss mailing list dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org http://www.dmarc.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc-discuss NOTE: Participating in this list means you agree to the DMARC Note Well terms (http://www.dmarc.org/note_well.html)
