John R Levine writes: > They will not break things for the sake of breaking them.
Of course not. They'll break *some* things for the sake of dealing with *other* breakage that's more important to them. I don't see a good reason for thinking that they'll agree on the "other breakage", either. GMail participates in DMARC but mitigates by disrespecting "p=reject", a central protocol of the policy part of DMARC. Yahoo! participates but Yahoo! Groups mitigates by moving the mailbox into the display name, as specifically deprecated by the DMARC FAQ. Remember, I'm here with a specific commission: to advocate the interests of mailing lists, as understood by the Mailman developers. I've said that several times. We are among the folks worst harmed by Yahoo!'s and AOL's actions. I see no reason to expect them to change their definition of "less broken than the alternative" to emphasize us. If the IETF chooses to side with them, and offer its sympathy but no help to us, fine -- not every problem has a solution satisfactory to all parties. But I'm not going to accept an *assumption* that everything is going to work out fine "because nobody *wants* to break things." Explain why goodwill will make things work for us. Please! AIUI, at this point[1] we have *one* protocol we want to provide and *no* validating experience (see Murray's response to your version bump examples) for "cumulative versioning" in Internet protocols. Ned himself declares knowledge of "extensible" protocols with "critical overrides" that ended in fragmentation and failure of interoperability. (Though he declares that he thinks the DKIM/DMARC circumstances are different, as presented so far that's just opinion, even though it is an expert's opinion.) We know that this particular set of protocols is controversial and failure of interoperability causes real harm to *third parties*. I don't see a good reason for experimenting with "extensible protocols" and "protocol versioning", at the same time as we're struggling with a problem that is in itself very hard and high-risk. Regards, Steve Footnotes: [1] Evidently Dave Crocker has a much wider view of the mission of a potential working group, but over the last couple of weeks discussion has focused on delegation and third-party authorization. _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list dmarc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
