> Roughly 80% of those reports are from Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft.
>
> Is 20% success sufficient for me to switch to p=reject?  I guarantee you it 
> is 
> not.  At the end of the day, without the large providers on board, any 
> solution that requires change at both the sender and the receiver needs the 
> large providers on board or it's useless.

And from Murray:

> There's still that pesky registration problem to address.

Checking DNS for third party authorization may be workaround for this problem 
at a large provider (Microsoft) but publishing them on behalf of Microsoft 
would be a tough (probably impossible) sell. If I own my own domain, I can keep 
track of mailing lists for a few dozen users. But something like outlook.com 
has millions of years. The registration problem means that either we have to 
review hundreds or thousands of additions per day (or a bootstrap of tens of 
thousands) or automate it. But if we automate it, that has its own problems:

- What's the threat model? How do we prevent malicious sign ups?
- The outlook.com sign-up is self-serve; this means that anyone can sign-up for 
outlook.com and create their own mailing lists and subscribe to it, and then 
outlook.com would need to automatically add that to its DNS zone. In other 
words, a complete outsider can register something in the zone that is 
maintained by Microsoft. This can be abused (a spammer could blow up the zone 
by doing this tens or millions of times per day using a botnet).
- When do we remove things from DNS?

That's a big risk. I can't speak for the company, but I think we'd rather live 
with the DMARC p=reject inconvenience than allow a regular user to publish 
anything to its DNS zone.

-- Terry

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