And again from the right address, sigh.

Brandon


On Fri, Dec 1, 2017 at 2:10 PM Brandon Long <bl...@google.com> wrote:

>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 11:38 PM Murray S. Kucherawy <superu...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:52 PM, Seth Blank <s...@sethblank.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Replace 5.1.1 with:
>>>
>>> 5.1.1. ptypes and properties for arc-info
>>>
>>> Certain information pertinent to ascertaining message disposition can be
>>> lost in transit when messages are handled by intermediaries. For example,
>>> failing DKIM signatures are sometimes removed by MTAs, and most DKIM
>>> signature on messages modified by intermediaries will fail. Therefore, a
>>> passing DKIM-Signature from the first ARC signer is likely to have been
>>> removed by final receipt of the message.
>>>
>>> The AAR, and in particular the ptype-properties stamped in arc-info,
>>> provide a mechanism for this information to survive transit.
>>>
>>> The ptypes and properties defined in this section SHOULD be stamped in
>>> the AAR:
>>>
>>> * smtp.client_id - The connecting client IP address from which the
>>> message is received;
>>> * header.ds - The domain/selector pair for each dkim signature on the
>>> message (header.ds=example.com,selector)
>>> * arc.closest_fail - The hop number of the most recent AMS that fails to
>>> validate, or 0 if all hops pass.
>>>
>>
>> Why "client_id" instead of "client-ip"?  (it's an IP address, not some
>> opaque identifier)
>>
>
> agreed on ip instead of id.
>
> Why "header.ds" and not "header.d" and "header.s"?  (why combine them?)
>>
>
> agreed on not combining things like this, sure string.split is easy and
> all, but let's use the parsing/etc we already have.
>
> Brandon
>
> Why "arc.closest_fail" and not "arc.closest-fail"?  (use a hyphen, to be
>> consistent with other entries already in the registry)
>>
>> Unless someone wants to point me at the part of the spec that says
>> otherwise, the IP address is utterly orthogonal to anything ARC is doing.
>> I'd rather not shoe-horn it in here, even if DMARC operators might want
>> it.  Rather, we should do a separate document (outside this WG if needed)
>> that registers a header field for this, since there's been something like
>> X-Original-IP in public use for years anyway, and then just require that it
>> be signed or something.  Or if we really want it in A-R, register it
>> accordingly, independent of ARC.
>>
>> But if we want to do that last thing, I'd like to have some sort of
>> discussion on the record for changing the scope of A-R, which is really
>> what we're talking about here.  As I've said before, A-R's original purpose
>> was to collect data about authentication work done at the ingress MTA that
>> might be of interest to users or filters.  We've specifically kept things
>> like IP addresses unregistered on the basis that your average human won't
>> know whether to trust one string of octets over another, and there's a
>> treatise in the appendix of RFC7601 and all of its predecessors that lays
>> out why.  But that's the logic we applied eight years ago when RFC5451 was
>> written.  If in the intervening time we've decided we want to repurpose it
>> to carry arbitrary stuff that might be of benefit to filters and concede
>> that users aren't the likely primary consumers as we intended, then we
>> should probably do up an RFC7601bis that says so, and renovate the prose
>> and registries accordingly.  I'll put the editing work in, but there has to
>> be recorded consensus to back that move.
>>
>
+1 to 7601bis on Kurt's terms.


>
>> ===============
>>>
>>> Open questions:
>>>
>>> 1) The optimal ABNF for AAR would inherit the A-R payload ABNF from
>>> 7601. Unfortunately, authres-header was defined in a way that makes this
>>> difficult. Is there a better way to say that the AAR inherits the A-R
>>> payload, and if anything modifies the definition of authres-header in 7601,
>>> the AAR also needs to inherit this change?
>>>
>>> To be super specific, this is the current authres-header ABNF from 7601:
>>>
>>>      authres-header = "Authentication-Results:" [CFWS] authserv-id
>>>               [ CFWS authres-version ]
>>>               ( no-result / 1*resinfo ) [CFWS] CRLF
>>>
>>> Optimally, there would be:
>>>
>>>      authres-payload = [CFWS] authserv-id
>>>               [ CFWS authres-version ]
>>>               ( no-result / 1*resinfo ) [CFWS] CRLF
>>>
>>> And then we could have:
>>>
>>>    arc-authres-header = "ARC-Authentication-Results:" [CFWS] arc-info
>>> authres-payload
>>>
>>
>> That seems reasonable to me.
>>
>> 2) The optimal way to transmit DKIM selector information is in the DKIM
>>> A-R methodspec as header.s. If we want to prevent a normative modification
>>> of 7601, I've proposed "header.ds" which will accomplish the same thing.
>>>
>>
>> Why the merge?
>>
>> 3) In the ARC-Seal megathread, there was an aside about knowing the last
>>> hop which validated:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Bron Gondwana <br...@fastmailteam.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> > That seems like it would be enough to fix that objection.  An
>>> additional "first AMS failure" header at each hop would give you a list of
>>> who actually modified the message.
>>>
>>> arc.closest_fail has been defined to accomplish this.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not sure I like a hop number in here, which harkens back to Received
>> counts.  I'd rather say it's an instance number, or better yet the sealing
>> domain name.
>>
>> 4) Have the ptype-properties been defined properly, and will these AAR
>>> ptype-properties need an IANA registry?
>>>
>>
>> If we decide we want AAR separate from of AR, then we also need to decide
>> if AAR uses the AR registry (in which case all of this has to get mushed in
>> with regular A-R stuff, but flagged "ARC use only" or something (ick), or
>> we'll need our own registry (ugh).
>>
>> -MSK
>> _______________________________________________
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>> dmarc@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
>>
>
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