In article <3efe1445-4a58-cdf2-9c06-d8ffb3ce1...@gmail.com> you write: >There's a chance that it is possible to specify a small range of >modifications and arrange a style of signing that could survive them. >So for originating and mediating sites that conform to that range, a >'preserved' original authentication might be possible. > >However... > >I don't remember enough detail from the original dmarc discussions, so I >don't remember how much of this was discussed, but I vaguely think it >was covered.
It definitely came up in DKIM. It rapidly became clear that there are many things that lists do that have simple user semantics but are hopeless to describe in terms of bytes in the message, e.g., reordering or deleting MIME parts. >That leaves just a staged trust model, establishing a basis of >accountability (and reputation) for the mediator sequence. Hence, ARC. Agreed, it seems unlikely we can do any better. R's, John _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list dmarc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
