On Thu 31/Dec/2020 11:15:07 +0100 Laura Atkins wrote:
On 30 Dec 2020, at 23:22, Jim Fenton <fen...@bluepopcorn.net wrote:
On 29 Dec 2020, at 12:59, John Levine wrote:
In article <14d833ce-0ae0-f818-fd4f-95769266a...@mtcc.com you write:
On 12/29/20 12:10 PM, John Levine wrote:
A lot of tiny non-profits like Girl Scout troops use email addresses
at webmail providers and send their announcements through ESPs like
Constant Contact and Mailchimp. This is yet another situation where
DMARC can't describe an entirely normal mail setup.
Constant Contact apparently got Yahoo to give them a signing key,
at least temporarily, but that doesn't scale.
What gmail does for gsuite is generates (or not, who knows) a key and
gives you the selector to add to your dns. I don't see why that doesn't
scale for all situations.
To point out the obvious, because they use a single address at yahoo.com
or gmail.com or hotmail.com, not a private domain. These are tiny
organizations that don't have a lot of computer expertise nor a lot of
need for it. >>
But these Girl Scout troops are going to publish a DMARC policy despite their
lack of expertise?
Many Girl Scout troops were affected when Yahoo published p=reject. Which is
probably why John brought it up. This isn’t a hypothetical, this is things that
we know actually happened and real world effects of DMARC.
I'd guess the problem they experienced have been mailing list and submissions
using ISP's bundled services or similar unauthorized MSAs. The former is fixed
by From: rewriting, the latter has no possible fix.
Are there other unwanted effects?
Best
Ale
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