On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 8:56 AM Scott Kitterman <skl...@kitterman.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On October 25, 2023 11:56:25 AM UTC, Alessandro Vesely <ves...@tana.it>
> wrote:
> >On Wed 25/Oct/2023 13:12:32 +0200 Barry Leiba wrote:
> >>>> * Is there consensus on moving ahead with the idea of a way to
> indicate which authentication method(s) the Domain Owner wants Receivers to
> use?  If so, it doesn't seem to be in the document yet.
> >>>
> >>> My recall is that we want to limit DMARC evaluation to DKIM only, for
> the edge cases of domains with over-wide SPF policies, since they proved to
> be vulnerable to false DMARC pass.  The WG discussed the possibility to
> also require both methods to limit replay, and concluded that the idea was
> a foot gun.  Hence the WG agreed on the comma syntax.
> >>
> >> My reading of the discussion is:
> >>
> >> 1. We did not have rough consensus to eliminate the use of SPF in DMARC.
> >
> >
> >Yes.
> >
> >
> >> 2. We did not have rough consensus to complicate DMARC by having the
> publishing domain specify authentication methods.
> >
> >
> >One thread started here:
> >https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/PDktxOYkB28k6ukLDgDqlp6NEGw/
> >
> >It ends up with Wei recapitulating the thread and summarizing the changes
> to the draft.  No objections.  I expected those changes to be carried out.
> >
> >
> >> Ale, you're saying that my reading on (2) is wrong, yes?  Can you
> provide support for that?
> >
> >
> >I had only seen Scott's reading, which surprised me.  After you and
> Michael hold that no agreement was reached, I begin to doubt of my reading
> myself.
> >
> >In particular, since there is a paper[*] showing how a "spoofed email
> >purporting to be b...@state.gov is delivered to a Gmail user’s inbox
> with no warning indicators", Wei's argument seemed to be fully reasonable.
> >
> >What outstanding objections were there?
>
> The purported use case is "my SPF is so awful you can't trust it and at
> the same time, so critical I still have to publish the record".  I don't
> think that's a real thing.
>
> If your SPF is unreliable, fix it or delete it.  Not a DMARC problem.
>

+1

We need to stop confusing operational/implementation issues on the part of
some with issues that reflect poor logic in a standard.

Michael Hammer
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