I think this would be a better place to start than proposing a solution. It's pretty clear that the thinking in this space is all over the map.
On Sun, Aug 19, 2018 at 9:29 AM, Livingood, Jason < jason_living...@comcast.com> wrote: > On 8/18/18, 7:03 PM, "DNSOP on behalf of bert hubert" < > dnsop-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of bert.hub...@powerdns.com> wrote: > Especially when such a move will incidentally kill intranets, VPNs, > split > horizon, DNS monitoring & DNS malware detecion and blocking. > > It seems to me that the underlying protocol is separable from the > operational implementation, and the latter case is likely where most of the > concerns lie. Thus, the issue is likely less DoH itself but rather how it > is likely to be deployed. > > I am considering starting work on a draft along the lines of 'potential > impacts of DoH deployment' to try to document some of this, if for nothing > else than to organize my own thinking on the matter. This is because I also > share concern, given the apparent deployment model, around what may break > in enterprise networks, malware detection & remediation, walled garden > portals during service provisioning, parental controls, and the impacts of > eliminating other local policies. The CDN-to-CDN competition case is an > interesting one as well, with respect to passing EDNS client subnet or not. > > JL > > >
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