Interesting. This approach is similar to the lists curated by Frank
and people from dnscrypt-proxy: https://dnscrypt.info/public-servers

Assuming that separating protocol change from trust model change is a
no-go, then the trust would need to go both ways - the network
operator would need to push the list of resolvers that she considers
trusted, and the client would crosscheck that list to its provisioned
configuration (or list downloaded from a public service such as this
etc.). This is conceptually similar to NPN/ALPN.

Marek

On Sun, Aug 19, 2018 at 11:35 AM, Tom Pusateri <pusat...@bangj.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 19, 2018, at 9:29 AM, Livingood, Jason <jason_living...@comcast.com>
> wrote:
>
> On 8/18/18, 7:03 PM, "DNSOP on behalf of bert hubert"
> <dnsop-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of bert.hub...@powerdns.com> wrote:
>    Especially when such a move will incidentally kill intranets, VPNs, split
>    horizon, DNS monitoring & DNS malware detecion and blocking.
>
> It seems to me that the underlying protocol is separable from the
> operational implementation, and the latter case is likely where most of the
> concerns lie. Thus, the issue is likely less DoH itself but rather how it is
> likely to be deployed.
>
> I am considering starting work on a draft along the lines of 'potential
> impacts of DoH deployment' to try to document some of this, if for nothing
> else than to organize my own thinking on the matter. This is because I also
> share concern, given the apparent deployment model, around what may break in
> enterprise networks, malware detection & remediation, walled garden portals
> during service provisioning, parental controls, and the impacts of
> eliminating other local policies. The CDN-to-CDN competition case is an
> interesting one as well, with respect to passing EDNS client subnet or not.
>
> JL
>
>
> In the DRIU BOF, I mentioned establishing a reputation service for public
> DNS resolvers. With a JSON interface, this could lead to users conveying
> some trust of a public service or more likely, the inverse of trust for
> operating systems or stub resolvers to whitelist/blacklist public DNS
> resolvers.
>
> I tried to summarize it here:
>
> https://dnsdisco.com/reputation-post.html
>
> Or you could go listen to the proceedings of the DRIU BOF.
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>

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