> On 16 Feb 2024, at 12:35, Edward Lewis <edward.le...@icann.org> wrote: > > The potential for abuse does exist, but the potential isn't addressed by > documenting "key collisions should not allowed."
Indeed. > I do agree that key collisions should be avoided, for the sake of key > management, but given the difficulty in avoiding them in all cases, I can't > see that a protocol action can be taken to rule them out. And there will > always be non-compliant malicious-intent code available to cause collisions > if collisions are indeed desired for abusive reasons. The solution here is > to roll out the notion across implementations that it is acceptable for a > validator to fail a data set's DNSSEC validation based on time/computational > complexity. I agree with this too. The latest patches to mitigate the keytrap vulnerability are welcome and much appreciated. Though IMO they’re a short-term fix. A long-term solution would be implementation guidelines as outlined above or to hard-fail validation whenever there’s a key tag collision. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
