mTLS might be the most pragmatic approach today in many situations, but I don't think we can recommend it in the way that this draft would. It has some significant downsides, especially when compared against something like OAuth (which might integrate better with user account systems) or Privacy Pass* (which has much better privacy properties). It's true that these mechanisms can't be used with DoT and DoQ today, but it is within our power to fix that if we care to.
If the only significance of this draft is today "mTLS works as you would expect for DoT, DoQ, and DoH", then I don't think we need a draft to tell us that. --Ben *I am a co-chair of PRIVACYPASS but I am speaking only as an individual participant.. ________________________________ From: Tommy Jensen <Jensen.Thomas=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org> Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2024 2:41 PM To: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org> Cc: Damick, Jeffrey <jdam...@amazon.com>; Jessica Krynitsky <jess.krynit...@microsoft.com>; Engskow, Matt <mengs...@amazon.com> Subject: [DNSOP] Re: [EXTERNAL] New Version Notification for draft-tjjk-cared-00.txt Hello dnsop, Not to distract from the "should we deprecate DNS64" discussion I started after proposing updates to 7050, but this is the second draft (last one, I promise) I'll be proposing to this group as interesting work ahead of Hello dnsop, Not to distract from the "should we deprecate DNS64" discussion I started after proposing updates to 7050, but this is the second draft (last one, I promise) I'll be proposing to this group as interesting work ahead of IETF 120. Joining me are co-authors Jessica from Microsoft and Jeff and Matt from Amazon. In light of enterprises increasingly using encrypted DNS for their own "Protective DNS" resolvers, we are proposing best practices for when and how to use client authentication with encrypted DNS. Since this is a Good Thing for enterprises who control both peers (stronger security for client policy application and security auditing post-attack) and a Bad Thing otherwise (privacy violations for the non-enterprises cases common to consumers), we feel there is a need to specify when implementors should or should not use it. Spoiler alert: we prefer mTLS as the ideal authentication mechanism. I'll let the draft speak for itself as to why. Feedback and discussion is welcome. Thanks, Tommy ________________________________ From: internet-dra...@ietf.org <internet-dra...@ietf.org> Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2024 11:32 AM To: Jeffrey Damick <jdam...@amazon.com>; Jessica Krynitsky <jess.krynit...@microsoft.com>; Matt Engskow <mengs...@amazon.com>; Tommy Jensen <jensen.tho...@microsoft.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] New Version Notification for draft-tjjk-cared-00.txt A new version of Internet-Draft draft-tjjk-cared-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Tommy Jensen and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-tjjk-cared Revision: 00 Title: Client Authentication Recommendations for Encrypted DNS Date: 2024-06-27 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 11 URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tjjk-cared-00.txt<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tjjk-cared-00.txt__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!_8-BG_G6wHMcs_UVkwXqP0aVV9tQKSxtFZUsEClBxt2Mdmibw_KPRkiy1Bwe1ic3RrtchGlsJQRm-doecb78MhYiKeo$> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tjjk-cared/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tjjk-cared/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!_8-BG_G6wHMcs_UVkwXqP0aVV9tQKSxtFZUsEClBxt2Mdmibw_KPRkiy1Bwe1ic3RrtchGlsJQRm-doecb78334FWQc$> HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tjjk-cared-00.html<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tjjk-cared-00.html__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!_8-BG_G6wHMcs_UVkwXqP0aVV9tQKSxtFZUsEClBxt2Mdmibw_KPRkiy1Bwe1ic3RrtchGlsJQRm-doecb78WQDEe_U$> HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tjjk-cared<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tjjk-cared__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!_8-BG_G6wHMcs_UVkwXqP0aVV9tQKSxtFZUsEClBxt2Mdmibw_KPRkiy1Bwe1ic3RrtchGlsJQRm-doecb78MUDB5QU$> Abstract: For privacy reasons, encrypted DNS clients need to be anonymous to their encrypted DNS servers to prevent third parties from correlating client DNS queries with other data for surveillance or data mining purposes. However, there are cases where the client and server have a pre-existing relationship and each peer wants to prove its identity to the other. For example, an encrypted DNS server may only wish to accept resolutions from encrypted DNS clients that are managed by the same enterprise. This requires mutual authentication. This document defines when using client authentication with encrypted DNS is appropriate, the benefits and limitations of doing so, and the recommended authentication mechanism(s) when communicating with TLS- based encrypted DNS protocols. The IETF Secretariat
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