I haven't attempted to fully understand this specification, with all
of its roles. However, I do not think the proposed usage of SVCB is
compliant with RFC 9460.
The SVCB record type is for identifying hosts ("endpoints") that
provide a service via IP. It seems like the SVCB type is being used
here to encode a different kind of relational graph between names.
That should be accomplished using a different RR type.
I also doubt the wisdom of relying on DNSSEC for security in this
system. Virtually no end-user systems perform DNSSEC validation
today, and most domains are not signed. Given OP's stated goal of
proving provenance to end-users, this seems like a major problem.
Reliance on DNSSEC also seems to be unnecessary, since OP proposes to
operate its own cryptographic root program. Finally, the vast
majority of DNSSEC-signed domains are signed by a third party DNS
operator, not the domain holder per se. Such a DNS operator would
have the ability to impersonate their customers in OP, in this model.
--Ben
On Thu, Nov 5, 2026 at 4:38 PM Shigeya Suzuki <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> >
> Hi DNSOP,
>
> I submitted draft-shigeya-dns-opkey-00, "Using Secure DNS for Originator
> Profile", and would like this group's feedback, both on the DNS design and on
> where the work should go.
>
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shigeya-dns-opkey/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!6Elsu0KnurJElB3GWu5ZBuWGK4OpoGeYNqnbkIWXsqmTaLKk9jMkn39sei2fsJVwNsS_wYENnO3Xevg$
>
> Originator Profile (OP) lets a verifier of web content, advertising, or email
> check who originated it, through signed profiles that issuers attach to the
> originator. A verifier needs to know, through an authenticated channel, that
> the originator's key is current, that its profile has not been revoked by its
> issuer, and that the issuers' own keys are current. The draft uses
> DNSSEC-signed DNS for these signals only. The profiles themselves are not
> distributed through the DNS, and keys are never taken from the DNS.
>
> What the draft defines, all under a new `_op` label:
>
> - OPKEY, a new RR type with the TLSA RDATA format, restricted to usage 3,
> selector 1, and matching type 1 or 2 (a digest of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
> It is published at `_issuer-key._op.<issuer>` for issuer keys, and at
> `<label>._originator-key._op.<cp-issuer>` for each originator profile. The
> presence of a Secure RRset means the profile is not revoked; a Secure
> NXDOMAIN or NODATA means it is revoked. Until a type value is allocated, the
> same RDATA is published as TLSA at the same names.
> - An SVCB RRset at `_op.<originator>`, naming the issuers the originator
> accepts. An AliasMode record with a TargetName of "." states that the
> originator has no profile.
> - A TXT RRset at `<label>._revocation._op.<pa-issuer>`, whose presence
> revokes an annotation on a profile.
>
> Only Secure answers are used. Bogus, Insecure, and indeterminate results are
> failures, never absence, and wildcards are not allowed at these names. The
> draft is intended as Experimental. The experiment is whether a new RR type
> can be put into service by the hosting providers and verifiers involved, so
> that the TLSA form and the fallback can be dropped.
>
> Questions on which I would especially welcome comments:
>
> 1. A new RR type with the TLSA format, following SMIMEA and OPENPGPKEY,
> rather than TLSA itself at `_op` names. The draft does this to keep the
> semantics of the two types apart.
> 2. Using a Secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA as the revocation signal for a profile.
> 3. The use of SVCB, including AliasMode with ".", to state an originator's
> accepted issuers, or that it has none.
> 4. TXT for annotation revocation.
>
> I would also like advice on the right home for this work. I understand that
> the call for DNSOP agenda items for IETF 127 closed on October 31, so DNS
> DISPATCH will most likely have to wait until the next meeting. If a slot does
> open up at IETF 127, though, I would be glad to take it.
>
> Related documents (published on October 27th):
>
> - Originator Profile Framework - Architectural Overview:
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/aov/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!6Elsu0KnurJElB3GWu5ZBuWGK4OpoGeYNqnbkIWXsqmTaLKk9jMkn39sei2fsJVwNsS_wYENQDfi6Fg$
> - Originator Profile Framework - Core Specification:
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/core/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!6Elsu0KnurJElB3GWu5ZBuWGK4OpoGeYNqnbkIWXsqmTaLKk9jMkn39sei2fsJVwNsS_wYENwxcciNg$
> - Originator Profile Framework - Web Media Use Case Specification:
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/web-media/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!6Elsu0KnurJElB3GWu5ZBuWGK4OpoGeYNqnbkIWXsqmTaLKk9jMkn39sei2fsJVwNsS_wYENu1jLz2M$
> - Originator Profile Framework - Email Use Case Specification:
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/email/__;!!Bt8RZUm9aw!6Elsu0KnurJElB3GWu5ZBuWGK4OpoGeYNqnbkIWXsqmTaLKk9jMkn39sei2fsJVwNsS_wYENa0liGHI$
>
> thanks,
>
> Shigeya Suzuki, Ph.D
> Keio University / WIDE Project / Originator Profile CIP
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