Hi DNSOP, I submitted draft-shigeya-dns-opkey-00, "Using Secure DNS for Originator Profile", and would like this group's feedback, both on the DNS design and on where the work should go.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shigeya-dns-opkey/ Originator Profile (OP) lets a verifier of web content, advertising, or email check who originated it, through signed profiles that issuers attach to the originator. A verifier needs to know, through an authenticated channel, that the originator's key is current, that its profile has not been revoked by its issuer, and that the issuers' own keys are current. The draft uses DNSSEC-signed DNS for these signals only. The profiles themselves are not distributed through the DNS, and keys are never taken from the DNS. What the draft defines, all under a new `_op` label: - OPKEY, a new RR type with the TLSA RDATA format, restricted to usage 3, selector 1, and matching type 1 or 2 (a digest of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo). It is published at `_issuer-key._op.<issuer>` for issuer keys, and at `<label>._originator-key._op.<cp-issuer>` for each originator profile. The presence of a Secure RRset means the profile is not revoked; a Secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA means it is revoked. Until a type value is allocated, the same RDATA is published as TLSA at the same names. - An SVCB RRset at `_op.<originator>`, naming the issuers the originator accepts. An AliasMode record with a TargetName of "." states that the originator has no profile. - A TXT RRset at `<label>._revocation._op.<pa-issuer>`, whose presence revokes an annotation on a profile. Only Secure answers are used. Bogus, Insecure, and indeterminate results are failures, never absence, and wildcards are not allowed at these names. The draft is intended as Experimental. The experiment is whether a new RR type can be put into service by the hosting providers and verifiers involved, so that the TLSA form and the fallback can be dropped. Questions on which I would especially welcome comments: 1. A new RR type with the TLSA format, following SMIMEA and OPENPGPKEY, rather than TLSA itself at `_op` names. The draft does this to keep the semantics of the two types apart. 2. Using a Secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA as the revocation signal for a profile. 3. The use of SVCB, including AliasMode with ".", to state an originator's accepted issuers, or that it has none. 4. TXT for annotation revocation. I would also like advice on the right home for this work. I understand that the call for DNSOP agenda items for IETF 127 closed on October 31, so DNS DISPATCH will most likely have to wait until the next meeting. If a slot does open up at IETF 127, though, I would be glad to take it. Related documents (published on October 27th): - Originator Profile Framework - Architectural Overview: https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/aov/ - Originator Profile Framework - Core Specification: https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/core/ - Originator Profile Framework - Web Media Use Case Specification: https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/web-media/ - Originator Profile Framework - Email Use Case Specification: https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/email/ thanks, Shigeya Suzuki, Ph.D Keio University / WIDE Project / Originator Profile CIP _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
