Hi,

(speaking for myself)

On 11/5/26 22:35, Shigeya Suzuki wrote:
- OPKEY, a new RR type with the TLSA RDATA format, restricted to usage 3, selector 1, and 
matching type 1 or 2 (a digest of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo). It is published at 
`_issuer-key._op.<issuer>` for issuer keys, and at 
`<label>._originator-key._op.<cp-issuer>` for each originator profile. The presence 
of a Secure RRset means the profile is not revoked; a Secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA means it is 
revoked. Until a type value is allocated, the same RDATA is published as TLSA at the same names.

Why not stay with TLSA?

In your underscore name specification, you can define semantics that expect 
usage 3, selector 1 etc.

- An SVCB RRset at `_op.<originator>`, naming the issuers the originator accepts. An 
AliasMode record with a TargetName of "." states that the originator has no profile.

That should be a PTR record.

- A TXT RRset at `<label>._revocation._op.<pa-issuer>`, whose presence revokes 
an annotation on a profile.

Your threat model apparently includes a DNS spoofing, else you would not need 
DNSSEC. (I think that's a reasonable threat model.)

However, an attacker spoofing responses (at least when on path) may be able to 
suppress responses and instead replay old ones, which will validate unless 
their signatures have expired. This includes NSEC/NSEC3 records proving the 
absence of a revocation record.

Your draft says on "Profile Annotations (PA)": "a verifier checks whether the PA 
issuer has revoked the PA ahead of the end of its Signature Validity Period".

Under your threat model and with the previous paragraph in mind, an attacker 
may be able to hide the revocation and force the verifier's view to be stuck at 
some previous but still-validateable state. Only once signatures have expired, 
you can be sure the verifier has an updated view, but in that case you may as 
well have removed the annotation instead of publishing a revocation record.

Hence, the value of revocation records is unclear.

As for DNSSEC, I'm not concerned to the same degree as Ben. The draft doesn't say who a 
verifier typically would be, so there's no reason to assume it would not have DNSSEC 
validator available. Even if on an end-user device, the verifier tooling could include a 
DNSSEC validation library. (Section 11.1 actually says this, "web media use case 
[...] has a verifier carry a validator".)

wildcards are not allowed at these names.

Why?

Also, you can't guarantee that, as online signers often hide them (synthesized 
responses look like non-wildcard, which can have various operational 
advantages).

The draft is intended as Experimental. The experiment is whether a new RR type 
can be put into service by the hosting providers and verifiers involved,

For context (but not necessarily with a pessimistic outlook), consider SPF, which, during 
experimentation, used specialized records of type 99 ("SPF") that mimicked TXT. 
This was later dropped in favor of TXT, see RFC 7208 Section 3.1.

Best,
Peter
_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to