----- Original Message -----
From: "Michael Richardson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: FW: [Dundi] DUNDi popularity
You need the PGP model instead.
Every DUNDi node needs to be a CA/signer. You can have web-of-trust.
You may also want to look at SPKI:
(Rivest= R of RSA, Ylonen=SSH)
2692 SPKI Requirements. C. Ellison. September 1999. (Format: TXT=29569
bytes) (Status: EXPERIMENTAL)
2693 SPKI Certificate Theory. C. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R.
Rivest, B. Thomas, T. Ylonen. September 1999. (Format: TXT=96699
bytes) (Status: EXPERIMENTAL)
That's more or less exactly what I was thinking in addressing Anders' issue,
then through the certs we have a handoff of trust, and while a single
failure would simply identify the end node (identical to the IP address
failure), a large scale failure (the real problem) would allow tracking of
the bad connectivity point allowing both routing around it, and any
additional remedies allowed under law.
Incidentally, through a small extension of the certificate (already enabled
through most of the options) we can include link tranversal costs, to
address the suggestion made by Jeffrey in a different subthread. With
increased connectivity these values would tend towards 0, but as an uptake
measure it might be of value.
Joe
_______________________________________________
Dundi mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.digium.com/mailman/listinfo/dundi
