I thought briefly about this method, and decided I wasn't clear on what it would be good for.
If you take the ABC example (where B is the center candidate with little support), B will have a majority pairwise vs. A or C. I have a hard time imagining that A or C could get enough approval to exceed this figure. If the voters are polarized around three candidates, ABC, and all deem D to be the least worst, D's pairwise victories will be even larger. So I wonder if this method is much good at eliminating turkey victories. One instance I thought of, where the approval winner could beat the CW: 33: Left>all, approve Left 30: Center>Right>Left, approve Center 37: Right>Center>Left, approve Right and Center Right is the CW but Center is the "AW." The 67 approval votes would beat the 37 Right>Center victory. However, the Right voters shouldn't have approved Center, and the Left voters could've ensured Center's victory as both CW and AW. Has anyone come up with a more interesting scenario? I had the thought that perhaps if you used Condorcet with limited ranks, in the event of a cycle it might be reasonable to use Borda points, assigning points based on the rank. This might be neater than having an approval cutoff. It would be clone-proof (entering clones is useless if you don't get more ranks for them). It would probably encourage some "approval strategy" (try to minimize or maximize points), but I doubt it would be strong enough to convince many people to actually leave ranks empty. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] > On Wed, 18 Jun 2003, Alex Small wrote: > > > Somebody on another mailing list has put forth an interesting > > Approval-Condorcet hybrid. I throw it out for consideration. I know some > > people here have done careful analyses of strategy in standard > > Approval-Completed Condorcet, I'm curious what people think of this: > > > > 1) Everybody submits a ranked ballot, equal rankings allowed, and also > > indicates yes/no for each candidate. > > 2) If there is no Condorcet Winner then elect the Approval winner. > > 3) If there is a CW, and he also has the highest approval, elect him. > > 4) If the Approval and Condorcet winners differ, compare the Approval > > winner's approval rating with the number of people who prefer the CW to > > the Approval winner. > > > > ex. Say that A beats B 51-49, but B has an approval rating of 55% while A > > has a 45% approval rating. B's 55 approval votes are greater than A's 51 > > votes over B, so B wins. > > > > Or, if A beats B 55-45, and the approval ratings are 52% (B) and 46% (A), > > A's 55 votes over B are greater than B's 52% approval rating. ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
