> --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit : > >>So utility has SOME KIND of value which i have demonstrated I do not >>understand. How about letting me in on the secret. > > > Maybe you can understand it in terms of "strength of preference," where > multiple "greater-than" signs are used in place of worth values. Perhaps > that will be more meaningful to you. > > Imagine these as the SENTIMENTS (these are not ballots) of the voters: > 49 A>>>>B>C > 2 B>>A>>>C (doesn't really matter) > 49 C>>>>B>A > > The Condorcet ballots arising from the above sentiments: > 49 A>B>C > 2 B>A>C > 49 C>B>A > > Please do not reply to this by pointing out that no one ranks B last. > That is indeed a useful fact, but it has nothing to do with utility.
Perhaps this collection of votes has been asked to carry a bigger burden
than it is capable of:
Condorcet does not support expressing the detailed sentiments that
are imagined above.
A backers like B better than C, as do C backers like B better than A.
Given this:
A backers have no possible profit from improving chance of C
winning.
Ditto C about A.
If B somehow became less attractive, basic non-plot votes would
change and we would have A competing with C with no schemes needed. Would
head in this direction if some of the A and C backers changed their backing.
>
> Looking at the SENTIMENTS it is evident that B is only barely preferred
> to most voters' last choice. If utility were measured as "the number of
> greater-than signs placed to the right of the candidate among all voters"
> (which would certainly make sense), we see immediately that B would have
> the lowest score.
>
> Relevance to the prisoner's dilemma: If the A and C cooperate and agree not
> to rank B>Worst, they gain a 50/50 chance of electing their favorite or
> electing their least favorite. If they don't or can't cooperate, they get
> a 100% chance of electing a candidate barely superior to Worst.
>
> So, if the A and C supporters can trust each other, they improve their
> expectation by bullet-voting. (But I don't think they will be able to
> trust each other.)
If this "utility" was something of value in the above election, there
could be truth in the above statement. As it is, A and C voters agreed
that B>Worst in each of their views, thus saying that (unless their own
candidate managed to win) B was the best they could do in this election.
>
> Relevance to other methods: I've argued earlier that Approval would be
> unlikely to elect B, because the Favorite>B preferences are much stronger
> than the B>Worst preferences.
>
> The fact that utility (strength of preference) isn't a big factor in
Condorcet
> elections, makes it an interesting point for comparison with other methods.
> That is its value.
>
>
> Kevin Venzke
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
