David Gamble wrote:
> Due to the nature of the Condorcet method- which considers lower preferences
> before the fate of higher preferences is decided- condorcet would appear to me
> to be a turkey electoral system.
Condorcet does not consider lower preferences before higher ones. It considers all preferences simultaneously.
> The fundamental difference as regards the results between condorcet and
> irving is that condorcet allows the election of candidates of candidates with
> little or no first or higher preference support. It is these candidates who are
> likely to be the turkeys.
This is theoretically true. But as I pointed out in my previous message, it seems extremely unlikely, that an anonymous turkey is going to be able to finagle his way onto the ballot of every single voter in the election. In order to get that sort of exposure, he is going to have to say something, which will of course turn some people off, regardless of what it is he says.
> AC 498 > BC 497 > CA 3 > CB 2
So every single A and B voter casts a second preference?? It only takes a tiny percentage of voters failing to do so to sink your "turkey". It is nearly impossible for a candidate to be simultaneously anonymous, and capable of getting everyone's attention.
More realistically, let's imagine a candidate who has moderate, or at least mixed (i.e. some one one side of the spectrum, and some on the other) views, who has a weak core of support, but manages to win a Condorcet election.
A>B>C 42% B>A>C 5% B>C>A 7% C>B>A 46%
So here we have a more realistic "turkey" scenario. A candidate with a core support of only 12% manages to win an election. Compare that, if you will, to the nightmare scenario of IRV:
10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft 10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft 15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft 16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft 15% Centrist>Left>Right>FarLeft>FarRight 13% Left>Centrist>FarLeft>Right>FarRight 11% Left>FarLeft>Centrist>Right>FarRight 10% FarLeft>Left>Centrist>Right>FarRight
Centrist has the most first place votes, the most second place votes, and the most third place votes. Centrist is the only candidate who does not appear fourth or fifth on any ballot. Centrist would win in a landslide over any other candidate in a two-way race. Centrist is quite obviously the popular choice by ANY reasonable measure.
In Condorcet, plurality, top two runoff, or really any reasonable method, Centrist wins. But in IRV, Centrist is eliminated before the final runoff, and Right wins in a squeaker.
To me, the IRV nightmare scenario is obviously far worse. In my nightmare scenario for Condorcet, no voter has any real reason to regret their vote after the election, while in the IRV vote a solid third of the electorate have good reason to regret their strategy.
> It occurs to me that the best way to win a single seat condorcet election is
> to stand on a platform of bland, vague and generalised policies that nobody
> could disagree with or be offended by.
Not to beat a dead horse, but this same criticism gets put up against approval voting as well. It's not surprising that the two methods get the same criticism, since they are closely related. After all, a Condorcet election reduced to an approval vote if every voter places all the candidates in either first or last place.
That said, I have argued in both my recent messages that it's pretty ridiculous to expect a candidate with undifferentiated opinions to get a vote, even a lower place vote, from nearly the entire electorate. People are not so easily duped, especially when the leaders of the political factions would be advising them to not cast a vote for Mr. anonymous in these situations.
-Adam
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