But, if I listen outside the door, IRV is making so much noise that few realize Condorcet exists, let alone that it is a preferable competitor.
Perhaps we need to sort out the similarities and differences more carefully, and get into more publicity.
SIMILARITY: BOTH do ranked voting, with identical ballots, intending to identify the best liked candidate, and usually agreeing as to winner. As we debate we concentrate on cases for which they differ, for those are the cases which are a source for debate.
DIFFERENCE: While Condorcet compares EACH pair of candidates and develops a matrix of pair counts to identify best liked, IRV puts emphasis on patterns, giving preference to those that are ranked first. See example below where B is much more popular than A, but IRV never sees this for C is more popular than B among B backers - even though all these C backers like B better than A.
Some call this an argument for IRV, claiming that those C votes were against B. Could be, sometimes, but more likely is a simple minor disagreement within B's party that does not create a smidgen of desire to have A win.
Differences:
Condorcet precinct results are a matrix small enough to publicize at that level, as well as being summable and publicizable at any level, including the whole district - even state level for governor. Even 10 candidates would be manageable for this - a 10x10 matrix.
IRV must forward a count of how many voters vote each pattern, or take part in the counting by forwarding first the first rank counts, and then forwarding changes as each loser is eliminated. Given 10 candidates there are a zillion possible patterns to forward - too many to publicize something understandable for many candidates at precinct level.
IRV can also offer an ugly surprise - a handful of absentee ballots can change the order of attending to losers, resulting in changing winner when there was no visible reason for expecting this. Absentee ballots could also change the Condorcet winner - but this is possible only when the candidates were close to a tie.
Condorcet cycles can also disturb some. Worth remembering that members of a cycle are near ties, identified as beating all outside the cycle. Thus, while there MUST be a predefined rule for resolving a cycle, just as for resolving a true tie, this is not a reason for giving up on Condorcet.
Example, designed to show difference between IRV and Condorcet:
40 A
30 C>B
30 B
This is incomplete - one last ballot to count. Last voter votes:
A - odds are against this, and leaves us a tie problem.
B - IRV and Condorcet agree that B wins:
IRV - C becomes loser.
Condorcet - B>A and B>C.
C>B - disagreement:
IRV - B loses; C loses; A wins; GREAT unhappiness among B backers.
Condorcet - a cycle, B>A and A>C and C>B, but B>A is stronger than C>B, so B backers are pleased.
Other competition:
Plurality - don't know why anyone reads this far if they are not ready to move on for something better.
Reruns of any sort - ask the French if these are not risky, while being expensive.
Approval - actually more complex for the voter than ranked voting - all that is needed for rank is better vs worse, Approval requires judgment as to cutoff, but does not let the voter express the ranking required to get this far.
PR - debate this another day - for the moment I am staying with elections with single winners, and not concerned with legislatures where PR MIGHT make sense.
Others - reject most for being complex, hard for voter to understand, and/or being subject to strategies.
Condorcet method details:
Seems correct and agreed that voters can give identical rank when candidates seem to deserve it. If it matters to the counting, give each candidate of a pair half a win (remember that Condorcet is doing only one pair at a time - 3 equal candidates will tie in 3 pairs). IRV could be unwilling to touch this one.
Seems right and agreed that voters not be required to rank all candidates - all not ranked are tied for last (except I would not count even half wins among these).
Seems right to me that a voter should not be required to use every rank - rank 2 is better than rank 4, and it should not matter when looking at these two whether there is a 3.
While IRV gets away from most of Plurality's spoiler problems, it has a few of its own. Condorcet simply DOES NOT DO spoilers.
Condorcet's matrices do not seem to get the positive attention I believe they deserve. Because they are distorted little, if at all, by thoughts of spoilers or voting strategy, counts for minor candidates warn:
Winners how serious they need to take these as warnings.
Minor candidates whether they need to change their approach.
IRV backers claim: "requiring a majority of votes to win" - seems like a worthless claim:
If they forbid truncation (an ugly thought), they could get there - by sometimes including ballots in which the voter showed dislike of the winner by ranking that candidate as that voter's almost last choice.
With truncation permitted, a majority of the ballots could have been exhausted before they declare a winner from the remaining minority of the total ballots.
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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