Dear Adam, you wrote (24 July 2003): > While winning votes-based Condorcet lacks the conventional spoiler problem, > it is still definitely present in margins-based Condorcet. (Markus, here's > an example of a Condorcet supporter using a clones-type spoiler.) > > Bush 49% > Gore 51% > > Obviously Gore wins (save the jokes). Now add in Nader: > > Bush 49% > Gore 24% > Nader>Gore 27% > > This example looks pretty similar to the eye to the ABC one you used, only > this one has the same spoiler as IRV when using margins-based Condorcet. > Winning votes Condorcet still gives the election to Gore by a wide margin > (sorry).
Gore and Nader are no clones in your example. They would have been clones only when this example had looked as follows: Bush 49% Gore>Nader 24% Nader>Gore 27% Whether independence from clones is violated has nothing to do with whether "winning votes" or "margins" are being used. Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
