Dear Eric, you wrote (24 July 2003): > Markus wrote (24 July 2003): > > Dave wrote (24 July 2003): > > > DIFFERENCE: While Condorcet compares EACH pair of candidates and develops > > > a matrix of pair counts to identify best liked, IRV puts emphasis on > > > patterns, giving preference to those that are ranked first. See example > > > below where B is much more popular than A, but IRV never sees this for C > > > is more popular than B among B backers - even though all these C backers > > > like B better than A. > > > Some call this an argument for IRV, claiming that those C votes > > > were against B. Could be, sometimes, but more likely is a simple minor > > > disagreement within B's party that does not create a smidgen of desire to > > > have A win. > > > > I wouldn't say that this is an argument for IRV against Condorcet or > > an argument for Condorcet against IRV. In my opinion, this is simply > > a description of the count. An argument is something like "Method X > > violates independence from clones while method Y meets independence > > from clones." but not something like "Method X counts the votes in > > this manner while method Y counts the votes in that manner." > > Perhaps it isn't an argument for or against any particular method, > but I would consider it an important point to make about any > particular method. > > It is because IRV fails to count votes in a better way that > contributes to (if not causes) its failing of more fundamental > criteria important to every voting method.
Yes, but instead of saying e.g. "I don't like method X because it counts the votes in such a way that monotonicity is violated." it is sufficient to say: "I don't like method X because it violates monotonicity." Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
