David, --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a �crit�: > > Eric Gorr wrote: >> For example, why is it the right thing for A to win in this case: >> 40 A >> 35 C > B >> 30 B
> The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would > see such a vote set in a real election) If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided not to run lest he spoil the election and throw it to A. This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first reason why I find IRV unacceptable. >and in the normal course of > discussion I would probably counter it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A > example with some comment about the importance of first preference > votes/utility, But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the Condorcet supporters do. > To get a reasonable result from Approval voting the voter needs to have at > least a working knowledge of how to vote strategically in an Approval election. > This is my major objection to Approval. Well perhaps parties could have "how to vote" cards. That's how IRV strategy works, isn't it? Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
