Why should it be considered important to find a majority when none exists? In my view, the very concept of 'majority' is meaningless when there are three or more candidates, and appears to be based on several logical fallacies including:
(1) Round number fallacy: The 50% figure is viewed as magical because it has the appearance of being a "natural" threshold. Which it is--if there are only two candidates.
It is a convenient threshold even with more candidates. If Joe gets over 50% in a Plurality election, then most of the voters would rather have Joe than would rather have any combination of the other candidates.
Majority tells us little in an Approval election. There could be TWO
candidates, each marked acceptable by about 60% of the voters - we have to
look farther as to whether Sam was liked better than Sue.
(2) Circular reasoning: Majority proponents generally have a particular method in mind for arriving at a "majority". This method is favored because it produces a majority, but the majority is defined in terms of the method.
This is a bigger deal, and IRV is the biggest sinner I notice at the moment.
Use of "majority" should be restricted to having over 50%, and require qualification if what is being considered is other than the obvious whole.
(3) Equivocation: The majority produced by a particular method is often touted as though it were equivalent to an outright majority of first-choice votes. But it would be easy to make a case that a candidate with a 49% plurality (or 45% or even 40%) really enjoys more public support in a 3-way race than someone with only 26% of first-choice votes and a similar number of 2nd-choice votes. In fact, don't some New York City elections require only a 40% plurality to avoid a runoff? This probably improves utility, if not Condorcet efficiency, while reducing cost.
Getting picky, we do not know for sure about "public support" from ballot counts. It could be that, by election time, there is no support for any and the voters are simply voting against the rottenest lemons. This is an argument for NOTA, to give the voters an escape from lousy selections of candidates.
Setting the decision point at 40% is deciding whether a runoff for Plurality will likely improve the result enough to be worth the pain:
If Sam got 45% in Plurality, he would likely win a runoff.
If Sam and Sue were near a tie in the 30s, makes sense for those who voted for others to get in on deciding between them.
The French recently reminded us that, while a runoff between the top two is easiest to arrange, that will not necessarily please the voters.
I had to read this twice to stop choking - "plurality" reads best here as a numerical word rather than an election method.
To be sure, it's nice when a clear winner emerges who has the support of more voters than all other candidates combined, but I wouldn't attempt to mandate this any more than I would attempt to mandate unanimity.
Plurality in some form is the only thing that makes sense, albeit a plurality which is not split by votes given to competing candidates.
It often needs qualification, as in the above 40%.
Bart
"John B. Hodges" wrote:
[...] The question I have is this: what if you STILL don't get a majority? For example, what if there are many, many candidates, the electorate is pretty close to evenly split, and everyone bullet-votes for their favorite? I know it's a hard case; if everyone bullet-votes, all election systems reduce to Plurality. But how, specifically, does MCA handle the mechanics of it? Has anyone written a formal description of MCA?
Most methods permit bullet voting, for those who can say all they wish to say this way. The better methods let those voters who choose, express their desires in more detail. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice.
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