Kislanko wrote: > > bartman writes: > > > >>(1) Round number fallacy: The 50% figure is viewed as magical > > because > > >>it has the appearance of being a "natural" threshold. Which it > > is--if > > >>there are only two candidates. [...]
> First, the >50% IS a magic threshold, if the term democracy is to mean > anything. In any two-alternative selection process with more than 2 > voters, the majority criterion is decisive. The difficulty that I refer you to my first paragraph, above (2nd sentence). There is also a "first-choice majority" criteria which seems defensible, to the effect that if one candidate happens to receive a majority of first choice votes, then that candidate should win. But if you have three candidates and no first-choice majority, then neither of the above flavors of 'majority' is applicable. > Condercet observed is that for three candidates the majorities that > prefer one candidate to another can overlap in such a way that most > prefer A over B, most prefer B over C, and most prefer C over A. Actually, when Condorcet was writing, the term 'majority' probably meant what we now call 'plurality'. Thus it is possible that a Condorcet winner can fail to have majority support in the modern sense (defined as > 50% of the electorate) over any candidate, even in the absence of a cycle or tie. If there is a Condorcet winner though, the CW will be preferred by a plurality over any of the other candidates. Bart ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
