to Ralph Suter, I liked this letter a lot. I especially liked the part where you took issue with Amy's treatment of Condorcet! I read that book too, and the part on Condorcet which you cited really bothered me. And the Lijphart quote, wow! I also agree that the 'punishing candidates who take clear stances on issues' part of the draft, which was the central argument, is poorly supported. I also agree that IRV retains many of the polarizing tendencies of plurality, and this is bad news.
my best, James [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: >I'm posting this to the Election Methods list and BCC'ing it to Rob >Richie >and Terry Bouricus of CVD. I hope they will take a look at the other >commentaries about the CVD draft on the EM list >(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/) that are likely to >be posted in the next few days. > >In a message dated 4/2/04 3:02:14 PM Central Standard Time, >[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > ><< Just became aware of this: > > Draft of CVD analysis about IRV vs. Condorcet Voting > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff/message/1548 > (The message archives are open to everyone) >> > > >My response to the draft: > >This subject needs honest, well-informed, fair-minded arguments, not >legal >brief-type arguments that misrepresent opponents and overstate the >positives of >one's own opinions. The CVD draft, unfortunately, is more like a legal >brief. > >The first misrepresentation is the draft's description of Condorcet >voting as >"a ranked-choice system favored by some mathematicians." The truth is >that >Condorcet voting is favored not only by "some mathematicians" but by a >large >number of very well-informed and sophisticated political scientists and >economists and if anything has gained increased favor among voting >experts in recent >years. A much better description is the following one in the Encyclopedia >of >Democracy (1995) by Arend Lijphart, a former president of the American >Political >Science Association and, ironically, a member of CVD's advisory board: > > There is such strong and widespread agreement among > experts that the Condorcet method is the most accurate > and fairest majoritarian formula that it has become the > yardstick against which other formulas are measured. > >The draft's misrepresentation of Condorcet is similar to a >misrepresentation >made by one of CVD's chief theoreticians, Douglas Amy, in his book >"Behind the >Ballot Box" (2000). In his brief description of Condorcet voting (p. >187), >Amy states: > > There is a long history of scientists and mathematicians > who dabbled in election theory and invented voting systems. > They include Jean-Charles de Borda, the Marquis de > Condorcet, and C. L. Dodgson -- better known as Lewis > Carroll, the author of "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland." > >Amy thus begins his analysis of Condorcet voting by describing its >author, >who took his politics so seriously that he lost his life in the French >revolution (and was one of the earliest advocates of gender equality) and >whose >influence among modern day political scientists is far greater than Amy's >ever has >been or ever will be, as a "dabbler." > >Other people on this list are much more qualified to comment on the rest >of >the draft than I am, but what bothers me most about it is it's emphasis >on the >possibility that mediocre candidates who refuse to express strong views >will >have an advantage over other candidates and that Condorcet "punishes >candidates >who take clear stands on controversial issues and rewards candidates who >say >little of substance." This is a major theme of the overall draft, and in >my >view it is extremely theoretical and debatable and probably quite >mistaken. > >Also, the draft neglects to mention perhaps the single greatest failing >of >IRV, that it undervalues and fails to adequately take into account the >information provided by voters in their 2nd choice, 3rd choice, etc. >rankings. As a >result, it can easily enable a popular but very divisive candidate in a >bitterly >divided electorate (as the U.S. electorate arguably is today, for >example) to >defeat a strong compromise candidate who is the second choice of a large >majority of the electorate but the first choice of fewer people than >favor two of >the most divisive candidates. Thus, Condorcet voting is arguably more >likely to >elect candidates that will reduce a society's divisiveness, while IRV is >more >likely to elect candidates that will sustain or even increase a society's >divisiveness. > >-Ralph Suter >---- >Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info