I think its a fair critique, but I would encourage you to approach them in a more positive fashion. For example, I think they do raise a number of valid points, and this seems the first most of us have seen of IRV supporters actually trying to tackle the issues head on.
I would encourage you to start with affirming their valid points before criticizing the (notable) weaknesses, as I think it will make it more likely for them to acknowledge your complaints. After all, you're trying to write *to* them, not *about* them, so it pays to be civil.
-- Ernie P.
On Apr 3, 2004, at 1:27 AM, James Green-Armytage wrote:
to Ralph Suter,
I liked this letter a lot. I especially liked the part where you took
issue with Amy's treatment of Condorcet! I read that book too, and the
part on Condorcet which you cited really bothered me. And the Lijphart
quote, wow! I also agree that the 'punishing candidates who take clear
stances on issues' part of the draft, which was the central argument, is
poorly supported. I also agree that IRV retains many of the polarizing
tendencies of plurality, and this is bad news.
my best, James
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:I'm posting this to the Election Methods list and BCC'ing it to Rob
Richie
and Terry Bouricus of CVD. I hope they will take a look at the other
commentaries about the CVD draft on the EM list
(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/) that are likely to
be posted in the next few days.
In a message dated 4/2/04 3:02:14 PM Central Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
<< Just became aware of this:
Draft of CVD analysis about IRV vs. Condorcet Voting http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff/message/1548 (The message archives are open to everyone) >>
My response to the draft:
This subject needs honest, well-informed, fair-minded arguments, not legal brief-type arguments that misrepresent opponents and overstate the positives of one's own opinions. The CVD draft, unfortunately, is more like a legal brief.
The first misrepresentation is the draft's description of Condorcet
voting as
"a ranked-choice system favored by some mathematicians." The truth is
that
Condorcet voting is favored not only by "some mathematicians" but by a
large
number of very well-informed and sophisticated political scientists and
economists and if anything has gained increased favor among voting
experts in recent
years. A much better description is the following one in the Encyclopedia
of
Democracy (1995) by Arend Lijphart, a former president of the American
Political
Science Association and, ironically, a member of CVD's advisory board:
There is such strong and widespread agreement among experts that the Condorcet method is the most accurate and fairest majoritarian formula that it has become the yardstick against which other formulas are measured.
The draft's misrepresentation of Condorcet is similar to a misrepresentation made by one of CVD's chief theoreticians, Douglas Amy, in his book "Behind the Ballot Box" (2000). In his brief description of Condorcet voting (p. 187), Amy states:
There is a long history of scientists and mathematicians who dabbled in election theory and invented voting systems. They include Jean-Charles de Borda, the Marquis de Condorcet, and C. L. Dodgson -- better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland."
Amy thus begins his analysis of Condorcet voting by describing its
author,
who took his politics so seriously that he lost his life in the French
revolution (and was one of the earliest advocates of gender equality) and
whose
influence among modern day political scientists is far greater than Amy's
ever has
been or ever will be, as a "dabbler."
Other people on this list are much more qualified to comment on the rest
of
the draft than I am, but what bothers me most about it is it's emphasis
on the
possibility that mediocre candidates who refuse to express strong views
will
have an advantage over other candidates and that Condorcet "punishes
candidates
who take clear stands on controversial issues and rewards candidates who
say
little of substance." This is a major theme of the overall draft, and in
my
view it is extremely theoretical and debatable and probably quite
mistaken.
Also, the draft neglects to mention perhaps the single greatest failing
of
IRV, that it undervalues and fails to adequately take into account the
information provided by voters in their 2nd choice, 3rd choice, etc.
rankings. As a
result, it can easily enable a popular but very divisive candidate in a
bitterly
divided electorate (as the U.S. electorate arguably is today, for
example) to
defeat a strong compromise candidate who is the second choice of a large
majority of the electorate but the first choice of fewer people than
favor two of
the most divisive candidates. Thus, Condorcet voting is arguably more
likely to
elect candidates that will reduce a society's divisiveness, while IRV is
more
likely to elect candidates that will sustain or even increase a society's
divisiveness.
-Ralph Suter
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