Markus said:
Dear John B. Hodges,
the following example demonstrates that Bucklin is vulnerable to "compromising" (i.e. insincerely ranking a candidate higher to make him win).
Markus, what method isn't "vulnerable to compromise"? Not BeatpathWinner (wv or margins). Not Plurality, IRV, Borda.
In your example below, the compromise takes victory from B and gives it to A. But 2/3 of the voters rank A over B. All the Condorcet versions choose A in that example.
So then, what you're saying is that Bucklin is "vulnerable" to protection of majority rule.
Vulnerable to protection of majority rule by upranking a compromise, but also, instead, more easily, by defensive truncation. So you'd probably also say that Bucklin is "vulnerable to truncation".
In the same way that Plurality is vulnerable to compromise. Some would say that's an odd way to describe strategy. "Vulnerable" impliess that the method allows something that it shouldn't allow. We often hear that methods are vulnerable to manipulation. When Nader-preferrers vote instead for the Democrat in Plurality, is that a manipulation that they shouldn't get away with? Manipulating the Plurality election in order to elect Dem over Repub, when a majority prefer Dem to Repub?
I'm not advocating that compromise in Plurality, but if a majority want to enforce majority rule, that isn't an undesirable manipulation. The method's strategy problem is to be judged by what that majority has to do in order to enfocre majority rule, or to protect a CW.
Of course, where Plurality, and often IRV, need favorite-burial to protect majority rule or the CW, Bucklin can always accomplish that with mere defensive truncation.
Where, you might ask, did Markus & Blake Cretney get their head-up-the-ass approach to "compromise" strategy, and
their notion of strategy as a manipulation that methods shouldn't be vulnerable to, rather than as a regrettable need for the voter?
They copied it off their academic authors, people entirely out of touch with voters' concerns and interest.
Mike Ossipoff
Example:
4 A > B > C 3 B > C > A 2 C > A > B
The unique Bucklin winner is candidate B. However, if the 2 CAB voters had insincerely voted ACB then the unique Bucklin winner would have been candidate A. Since these 2 CAB voters strictly prefer candidate A to candidate B, voting ACB instead of CAB to change the winner from candidate B to candidate A is a useful strategy for them.
Markus Schulze
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