Dear Mike, please remember that already in my 8 Sep 2003 mail I told you that at least every single-winner election method that satisfies the majority criterion is vulnerable to compromising. I wrote (8 Sep 2003):
> Actually, it can be shown that at least every > election method that satisfies the majority > criterion encourages voters to compromise. > > Example: > > 40 A > B > C. > 35 B > C > A. > 25 C > A > B. > > Suppose that the used election method meets the majority > criterion. > > Suppose that A wins the elections. Then the 35 BCA > voters can change the winner from A to C by voting CBA > (i.e. by "compromising"). > > Suppose that B wins the elections. Then the 25 CAB > voters can change the winner from B to A by voting ACB > (i.e. by "compromising"). > > Suppose that C wins the elections. Then the 40 ABC > voters can change the winner from C to B by voting BAC > (i.e. by "compromising"). Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
