Eric Gorr wrote:
At 8:16 PM -0800 11/14/04, Bart Ingles wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
At 7:44 AM -0800 11/12/04, Justin Sampson wrote:
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004, Eric Gorr wrote:
> Well, it will cause IRV to fail the Independence of Clones Criterion and
thereby be subject to a spoiler effect again.
Doesn't IRV suffer from spoiler effects anyway?
Depends.
The method itself passes the ICC, so spoilers cannot come from there.
Take a hypothetical IRV variant where candidates are eliminated at random, until a "majority" winner emerges. Would this method still pass ICC?
I cannot think of a case where random elimination of a candidate tied for least votes would cause IRV to fail ICC.
Actually, I wasn't thinking of ties, or of a system that would actually be used. I was thinking in terms of how far you could distort the method and still pass ICC. In other words, completely replace the usual "fewest first-choice votes" elimination rule with random elimination, or even eliminating the candidate with the most first-choice votes short of an outright majority. As far as I can tell, such a system would pass Mutual Majority; I just wondered if it would pass ICC.
If so, is the method spoiler free?
Depends on whether one wants to consider spoilers in the context of IIA.
There is always the possibility that spoilers can come from directions other then ICC and IIA.
What would be an example of a spoiler (ICC or other violation) which is NOT an irrelevant alternative?
Bart
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