James:
When, with wv Condorcet, a majority ranks ranks X, but not Y, and also rank X1 over X, they not only ensure that Y won't win, but SFC's s guarantee and GSFC's guarantee also apply with respect to X1 & X:
If X1 is in the sincere Smith set, and if X is not, and if no one falsifies a preference, and a majority vote X1 over X, then X won't win.
Is that true with your method too, when many of the X1>X majority are rating X equal to X1?
The fact that they're still technically voting X1 over X now works against your method's compliance, because it means that the premise of conditions of GSFC are met.
In fact,
If X1 is the CW, and no one falsifies a preference, and a majority preferring X1 to X rank X over X1, does that guarantee that X won't win, even if many of the X1>X majority are rating X equal to X1?
If not, then the price for compliance with your stronger SDSC is the complete loss of compliance with SFC & GSFC.
FReedom to truncate isn't worth the loss of SFC's & GSFC's guarantee that merely voting X1 over X, under those criteria's plausible premise conditoins, is enough to ensure that X won't win.
Mike Ossipoff
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