>James: Doesn't your method gain stronger SDSC by losing SFC & GSFC?
>
It passes stronger SDSC and fails SFC and GSFC, yes. However, I've said
that SFC (and GSFC, I assume) can be achieved in the cardinal pairwise
method by the use of a provision that states that a defeat agreed-with by
a majority should always be counted as stronger than a defeat that is not
agreed-with by a majority.
Hence, if you find SFC and GSFC to be very important, I suggest you
argue
for a version of cardinal pairwise with this majority-beat provision,
rather than arguing to scrap cardinal pairwise altogether. I think that
the version of cardinal pairwise with this provision passes stronger SDSC
as well as SFC and GSFC. So, there is not an absolute tradeoff.
Actually, I already wrote a posting which responds to the criticism that
cardinal pairwise lacks SFC compliance. Please give it a read and let me
know what you think about it. The post was on October 17th. Here's the
link:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-October/014067.html
One note: in that posting, I cite section "6.b" of my cardinal pairwise
proposal for the discussion on strategic incentive versus strategic
ability. In the newer, shorter versions of my proposal, this is section
7.b or 7.2 rather than 6.b. Anyway, the title of the section is "strategic
incentive and strategic ability". Recent versions of my proposal (the
short version) can be found via either of the following links:
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE19/ISSUE19.PDF
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.pdf
Sincerely,
James
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