On the back end, we could silently collapse the ratings into rankings by sorting the candidates, then apply Condorcet, IRV, etc. But, those make assumptions about the relative strengths of preference for the ranked choices and we don't need to make assumptions since we actually have relative strength data in the ballot.
Straight rating summation is vulnerable to strategic voting. Perhaps in this study people voted honestly because it obviously didn't matter and so there was no incentive to vote strategically. In a real election the stakes would be higher.
My favorite solution is to run Instant Runoff style disqualification cycles over Normalized Ratings (IRNR). I believe this method is strategy proof and passes a handful of other desirable election method criterion.
In general, the more (good,accurate,honest) information we get out of the voters, the better we should be able to maximize social utility. Conceivably, we could create a ballot that records a whole probability distribution from each voter about each choice expressing how much they like each choice and how sure they are and how they believe they might be wrong about a choice. Summing all such ballots up we ought to arrive at a choice that most likely makes the most people the happiest. I believe this level of detail is excessive for all but a telepathically linked cyborg society.
On Dec 15, 2004, at 6:42 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Will someone on the list who has studied range voting and compared it to
Condorcet, approval, and other methods please comment on Doug Greene's paper? He
appears to be saying that range voting is superior to all other single winner
methods. Are there good arguments against this conclusion? Does range voting
have serious flaws? If so, could someone briefly summarize them?
Thanks, Ralph Suter
In a message dated 12/15/04 3:08:26 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The long-awaited results of the Nov. 2004 range-voting presidential----
pseudo-election are now available. Paper also includes an
approval-voting pseudo-election and some other things! Packed with data
from the real world!
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html go to #82.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Brian Olson http://bolson.org/
---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
