MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
[Dave] continued:
BUT the voter's actions, such as strategy, have to be based on what is practical for voters to learn and use (it is too easy for EM members to design strategies that sound nice in EM debates, while not practical for public election voters to either get the data or process it).
I reply:
Of course we're very aware of that. That's why our favorite Approval strategy to tell people is:
Vote for whom you would in Plurality, and for everyone whom you like better.
That's not complicated, but it's perfectly good for maximizing expectation in Approval, and for quicklyl homing in on the CW.
It's better than Plurality in this regard, but not perfect.
For example:
2: Bush>Perot>Clinton (approval vote = Bush) 1: Perot>Bush>Clinton (approval vote = Bush + Perot) 2: Clinton>Perot>Bush (approval vote = Clinton)
The approval vote totals are:
Bush: 3 Clinton: 2 Perot: 1
and so Bush wins. But Perot is the Condorcet winner! ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
