Daniel Bishop wrote:
It's better than Plurality in this regard, but not perfect.
For example:
2: Bush>Perot>Clinton (approval vote = Bush) 1: Perot>Bush>Clinton (approval vote = Bush + Perot) 2: Clinton>Perot>Bush (approval vote = Clinton)
The approval vote totals are:
Bush: 3 Clinton: 2 Perot: 1
and so Bush wins. But Perot is the Condorcet winner!
The result above might make sense if the above vote reflects voter utilities similar to:
. 100 . . voter utility or rating . . 0 ---------------------------------------- 2 Bush . . . . . . . . . Perot . Clinton 1 Perot . Bush . . . . . . . . . Clinton 2 Clinton . . . . . . . . . Perot . Bush
But not if:
. 100 . . voter utility or rating . . 0 ---------------------------------------- 2 Bush . Perot . . . . . . . . . Clinton 1 Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush . Clinton 2 Clinton . Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush
I'm aware of the problems with interpersonal comparison of utilities, but have a hard time viewing the two cases as equivalent.
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