Dear Kevin,

FBC:
> By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite,
> a voter should never gain an outcome that he/she likes
> better than every outcome that he/she could get without
> voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite.

Suppose your sincere preference is A>B>C>D>E. Suppose in
situation #1, candidate A is elected with a probability of
60% and candidate B with a probability of 40%. Suppose in
situation #2, candidate A is elected with a probability of
70%, candidate B with a probability of 20%, and candidate C
with a probability of 10%. How does the used election method
know which situation you like better, when you can cast only
rankings and not ratings?

Markus Schulze
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