Dear Markus,

 --- Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : 
> FBC:
> > By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite,
> > a voter should never gain an outcome that he/she likes
> > better than every outcome that he/she could get without
> > voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite.
> 
> Suppose your sincere preference is A>B>C>D>E. Suppose in
> situation #1, candidate A is elected with a probability of
> 60% and candidate B with a probability of 40%. Suppose in
> situation #2, candidate A is elected with a probability of
> 70%, candidate B with a probability of 20%, and candidate C
> with a probability of 10%. How does the used election method
> know which situation you like better, when you can cast only
> rankings and not ratings?

I think, in short, that the "situation" (of odds distribution)
is not relevant to FBC. I think the quoted definition answers
the question this way: In neither situation 1 nor situation 2 (which
I assume to be obtained by voting differently) could the voter
obtain a "result" preferable to the best result in the other
situation.

I have to interpret "result" to mean "the candidate who actually
got the seat," since as you have noticed, a ranking of candidates can't 
usually be used to rank probability distributions.

Pretending Mike agrees with my interpretation (and that he clarifies FBC 
accordingly), do you think FBC would then be unambiguous?

Kevin Venzke



        

        
                
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