I already said that my criteria are intended to measure for the goal of getting rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, the goal of minimizing need for defensive strategy that keeps people from expressing what they actually want in an election.
But Iīd like to clarify that a bit. This is something that Iīve already said before, but, with the discussion these days, this is a good time to say it again:
A majority can get its way. The only question is, what does thaat majority have to in order to get its way.
The lesser-of-2-evils problem is a problem for a majority, for instance. For example, say that, in Florida in 2000, there was a strong majority who preferred Kerry to Bush. But they almost lost, because a few Nader-preferrers voted for Nader instead of helping Kerry (Thatīs ok if, like me, you didnīt consider Kerry deserving of a vote). Well, itīs ok in the sense that I vote that way, but it isnīt ok that it lets Kerry lose when a majority prefer Kerry to Bush.
So the problem is when a majority need drastic falsification in order to protect majority rule.
I define defensive strategy as strategy intended to protect the win of a CW or to protect majority rule. A precise definition of majority rule will be posted as soon as I catch up with the current and recent e-mail.
Because the lesser-of-2-evils problem is a problem of a majority, what that majority has to do in order to protect majority rule, it ísnīt surprising that most of my defensive strategy criteria are about a majority.
If a majority all want the same candidate to win, with almost any method they can easily make him/her win by all just voting that candidate over everyone else. Borda is an exception to that, because, with Borda, they could need to know how their opponents are voting in order to make their common favorite win. But, as I said, Borda is an exception.
But isnīt easy for a majority to keep a particular candidate from winning. In the well-known lesser-of-2-evils problem, the problem is to keep the greater-evil from winning. And the problem is that itīs necessary for some voters to bury their favorite in order to do so. (Well that situation doesnīt necessarily really exist in our political system, but, due to the lesser-of-2-evils problem, the mere media-deceived belief that thatīs so is enogh to make it effectively so).
So my majority defensive strategy criteria are about what a majority has to do in order to keep some greater-evil from winning.
So the subject of those criteria was chosen directly from the obvious nature of tjhe lesser-of-2-evils problem. What does a majority need to do in order to keep some greater-evil from winning?
No, Iīm not saying that, in a personīs preference ordering, thereīs necessarily one distinct greater-evil, as opposed so a smooth gradation of preference. I clarify that, before someone points it out to me. But the fact remains that, so often, there is a candidate whom a majority (at least think that they) need to bury their favorite in order to defeat. Thatīs why I wrote the majority defensive strategy criteria.
Mike Ossipoff
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