Daniel Bishop dbishop-at-neo.tamu.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:

I would start by simply choosing the CW if one exists, or paring the field down to the Smith set otherwise. Then I would eliminate the candidate with the lowest approval and repeat.

I thought of this yesterday while I was working out, and I thought I had come up with something big. Then I searched the EM archives and discovered that Kevin Venzke had mentioned it way back in 2003.

Oh, by the way, I would *not* allow equal rankings. Why not? I just don't like them.


Not a very convincing reason to me.

Well, at least it's honest!

They strike me as an unnecessary complication


How are they a complication? If anything, equal rankings make it *easier* to construct a pairwise matrix.

Equal rankings complicate matters for several reasons:

-- They create a potential debate about how they should be counted. Actually, this may not be an issue if you use the Condorcet-Approval hybrid scheme I explained above, so this objection may not be valid in this context. (The old "margins vs. wv" debate will be irrelevant!)

-- They complicate the vote-counting procedure and corresponding software. This may seem trivial in an academic environment, but in the real world it will be another potential source of bugs.

-- They complicate the voter interface and voting procedures. Yes, equal rankings are simple to implement with a vector of radio buttons next to each candidate's name, but I can virtually guarantee that such an interface will be considered unacceptable for general public use.

-- Last but not least, they complicate the explanation of the method to the general public. Just getting the public to understand and accept ranked voting will be a major endeavor in itself. Any unnecessary complications will just irritate the public and provide ammunition for those who dismiss the method as too complicated.

and little more than a way to game the system.


There's a potentially important practical advantage, in that it allows voters to cast a Cardinal Rankings-style ballot. For example, you could let:

Rank 1 = ideal candidate
Rank 2 = candidate I have minor disagreements with
Rank 3 = candidate I have major disagreements with
Rank 4 = candidate I wouldn't vote for even if he were running against Hitler and Stalin

I don't understand your point here. Are you ranking any of those candidates equal? And why would you even rank/approve the last candidate? Or are you proposing to rank more than one candidate at each of the four levels?


If there are a large number of candidates, this could be considerably easier for the voter than casting a fully-ranked ballot.

You wouldn't need to rank any more candidates than you would approve in an Approval election.


--Russ


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