>However, I see the following problem: When someone promotes a
>Condorcet method that violates monotonicity, then he cannot use
>IRV's violation of this criterion as an argument against IRV.
Yes, that is true, but I rarely if ever use monotonicity failure as an
argument against IRV. I feel that there are many pro-Condorcet/anti-IRV
arguments that are substantially more convincing. Of course, all else
being equal, I prefer that a method be monotonic.
>
>In situation 2 of my 12 July 2000 mail, beatpath chooses candidate F
>while sequential dropping chooses candidate D. You can fill the
>remaining pairwise defeats with arbitrarily chosen numbers. Then
>this example could look e.g. as follows:
Thank you Markus. What a complex and interesting example! Am I correct
in
thinking that minimax chooses E in this example, ranked pairs chooses D,
and river chooses F?
my best,
James
>AB 21
>BC 17
>CD 15
>DE 13
>EF 18
>FG 19
>GA 14
>DB 16
>GE 20
>AC 1
>AD 2
>AE 3
>AF 4
>BE 5
>BF 6
>BG 7
>CE 8
>CF 9
>CG 10
>DF 11
>DG 12
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