James G-A replying to Russ > >My first comment is that this proposal is significantly more complicated >than my (or Kevin's) "Ranked Approval Voting" (RAV) proposal, which >simply drops the least approved candidate until a CW is found.
Yes, I suppose the tally is harder to explain, although the interface is identical. However, you've not responded to the points I made in the last e-mail about strategic vulnerability in your RAV method. http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015226.html > >Secondly, I find it interesting that you define the magnitude of a >defeat in step 3 as, "the number of voters who place A above their >approval cutoff and B below their approval cutoff." This is equivalent >to using the difference of Approval scores for the two candidates (with >a constant offset). No, it isn't. You can have a very strong defeat even when a candidate with a higher approval score beats a candidate with a lower approval score. You seem to be imagining that I wrote "the number of voters who place A above their approval cutoff and B below it, ***minus the number of voters who place B above their approval cutoff and A below it***." But the second part of that sentence isn't in my proposal. This creates a world of difference, and that difference has important anti-strategic properties. Again, I urge you to read the cardinal pairwise paper and the strategy example posting. http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-September/013936.html >If you simply used the winning approval score rather >than the difference, I think your proposal would be equivalent to RAV. I don't use the difference. > >Elsewhere you have advocated using "winning votes" rather than "margins" >for the pairwise measure off Condorcet defeat magnitude, but here you >seem to be advocating "margins" for the defeat magnitude when it is >based on approval scores. Why the difference? What is the advantage of >using "margins" in your proposal? This is exactly where you are misunderstanding my proposal. Cardinal pairwise and approval-weighted pairwise both use winning rating differentials rather than marginal rating differentials. That's what makes these methods interesting. Please read the references I give you. >More importantly, does the advantage, >if there is one, justify the additional complexity of your proposal? I >must tell you that I'll be surprised if it does. Then again, it won't be >the first time I've been surprised. Yes, the benefits do justify the additional subtlety of the method. Because approval-weighted pairwise is more strategy resistant than RAV. > Sincerely, James http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info